

REMARKS

Newly submitted claim 23 is subject to an election/restriction requirement. This is believed overcome as claim 23 is hereby withdrawn.

Claims 1-9, 12-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph, as being indefinite. These objections are believed overcome by amendments to the claims.

Claims 1-22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as being anticipated by *Paatela et al.* (U.S. Publication No.: 2002/0163935). This rejection is respectfully traversed for the reasons set forth below.

Independent claims 1, 10, 12, and 21 include: ... a plurality of indicators; each of the plurality of indicators being associated with a plurality of platform layers and a plurality of protocols; and a plurality of devices associated with the plurality of indicators; each device configured to: receive a packet; detect a first protocol associated with the packet; cause the first indicator to be activated in response to detecting the first protocol; detect a second protocol associated with the packet; and cause the second indicator to be activated in response to detecting the second protocol, whereby the number of indicators depends on the number of protocols supported by each device.

The PTO provides in MPEP § 2131..."To anticipate a claim, the reference must teach every element of the claim...". Therefore, to sustain this rejection the *Paatela et al.* patent must contain all of the claimed elements of independent claims 1, 10, 12, and 21. However, the claimed invention is not shown or taught in *Paatela et al.*. Therefore, the rejection is unsupported by the art and should be withdrawn.

"A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described in a single prior art reference." *Verdegaal Bros. V. Union Oil Co. Of California*, 814 F.2d 628, 631, 2 USPQ2d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987)." "The identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as contained in the ...claim." *Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.*, 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

For these reasons, the rejection of independent claims 1, 10, 12 and 21, as now amended, should be withdrawn. Applicant submits that independent claims 1, 10, 12 and 21, along with the claims dependent therefrom, are allowable over *Paatela et al.*

Applicant further submits that the reference would be defective in establishing a *prima facie* case of obviousness, if rejected as such.

As the PTO recognizes in MPEP § 2142:

... The examiner bears the initial burden of factually supporting any *prima facie* conclusion of obviousness. If the examiner does not produce a *prima facie* case, the applicant is under no obligation to submit evidence of nonobviousness...

The Federal Circuit has held that a reference did not render the claimed combination *prima facie* obvious in *In re Fine*, 873 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988), because *inter alia*, the examiner ignored a material, claimed, temperature limitation which was absent from the reference. In variant form, the Federal Circuit held in *In re Evanega*, 829 F.2d 1110, 4 USPQ2d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1987), that there was want of *prima facie* obviousness in that:

The mere absence [from the reference] of an explicit requirement [of the claim] cannot reasonably be construed as an affirmative statement that [the requirement is in the reference].

In *Jones v. Hardy*, 727 F.2d 1524, 220 USPQ 1021 (Fed. Cir 1984), the Federal Circuit reversed a district court holding of invalidity of patents and held that:

The “difference” may have seemed slight (as has often been the case with some of history’s great inventions, e.g., the telephone) but it may also have been the key to success and advancement in the art resulting from the invention. Further, it is irrelevant in determining obviousness that all or all other aspects of the claim may have been well known in the art.

The Federal Circuit has also continually cautioned against myopic focus on the obviousness of the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art rather than on the obviousness vel non of the claimed invention as a whole relative to the prior art as §103 requires. See, e.g., *Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.* 802 F.2d 1367, 1383, 231 USPQ 81, 93 (Fed. Cir. 1986).


In the present case, the reference fails to teach all the limitations of the claimed invention. Thus, the rejection is improper because, when evaluating a claim for determining obviousness, all limitations of the claim must be evaluated. In this context, 35 USC §103 provides that:

A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the *subject matter* as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains ... (Emphasis added)

Because all the limitations of claims 1, 10, 12 and 21 have not been met by the *Paatela et al.* patent, it is impossible to render the subject matter as a whole obvious. Thus the explicit terms of the statute have not been met and the examiner has not borne the initial burden of factually supporting any *prima facie* conclusion of obviousness.

In view of the above, it is respectfully submitted that claims 1-22 are in condition for allowance. Accordingly, an early Notice of Allowance for the remaining claims is courteously solicited.

Respectfully submitted,


James R. Bell
Registration No. 26,528

Dated: 3-16-06
HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP
901 Main Street, Suite 3100
Dallas, Texas 75202-3789
Telephone: 512/867-8407
Facsimile: 214/200-0853
ipdocketing@haynesboone.com

I hereby certify that this correspondence is being deposited with the United States Postal Service as first class mail in an envelope addressed to: Mail Stop Amendment, Commissioner For Patents, P.O. Box 1450, Alexandria, VA 22313-1450	
on	<u>Mar 17, 2006</u>
Date	<u>Susan C. Lien</u>
Susan C. Lien	